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THE COMMUNITY LEGAL CLINIC
MOVEMENT IN ONTARIO:
PRACTICE AND THEORY, MEANS AND ENDS
Michael Blazer*
RISUME'
La loi peut 6tre le gardien du statu quo ou le moyen d'imposer des change-
ments sociaux en mettant lgitimement en question le statu quo. Les cliniques
juridiques offrent l'occasion de r~aliser la r~forme du droit. N~anmoins, la
thorie sociale, particuli~rement la th~orie marxiste, sugg~re que n'importe
quel changement social au niveau juridique n'est que superficiel et laisse
intact l'injustice de la structure 6conomique sous-jacente de la societ6. Le
cruel dilemme pour les mouvements sociaux, y compris les cliniques juridi-
ques, est celui-ci: tout ce qu'on fait au niveau superficiel (par exemple,
l'dtude des dossiers ou les activitds visant la r~forme du droit) n'a aucune
importance; les mouvements n'ont nile pouvoir ni les ressources n~cessaires
pour changer la structure sous-jacente de la soci6t6 et ne peut donc rien
changer.
L'auteur examine la croissance des cliniquesjuridiques en Ontario et sugg~re
que les cliniques peuvent dviter le dilemme en se concentrant sur le prdsent,
en joignant la fin et les moyens et en renforgant les conseils d'administration
autonomes 6lus par les collectivit~s locales plut6t qu'en cherchant allier la
thorie A la r~alit6. C'est en d~veloppant des conseils d'administration
autonomes que les cliniques peuvent atteindre leur but de pourvoir aux
besoins des personnes bas revenu. Les buts de plus de d6mocratie, de plus
d'6galit6, et d'une reduction de la hi~rarchie et de la d~pendance sont refl~t~s
dans l'organisation et les rapports mis en oeuvre pour r~aliser ces buts. La
fin s'allie aux moyens permettant la creation d'une base de pouvoir populaire
susceptible de changer la socidt6.
* Copyright © 1990, Michael Blazer. Mr. Blazer is an articling student with Cavalluzzo,
Hayes & Shilton, Toronto. This article was written in April, 1990, when the author was
a second-year student at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Before entering
law school, the author worked for several years in a community legal clinic in Toronto.
(1991) 7 Journal of Law and Social Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
In movements for social change, the law plays a seemingly paradoxical
combination of roles. It is at once the guarantor of justice for all and the
guardian of privilege. Sometimes it is the friend of the powerless and
dispossessed; sometimes the tool of the oppressor. It can be both profoundly
anti-democratic and the great equalizer. For poor people, for women, for
cultural minorities, the promise of equality before the law is a cruel joke and
yet a hopeful invocation of a better world. As one writer puts it:
... in its relation to custom and other sources of normative expectations, law
represents both the status quo and the device of revolution. It guarantees and
enforces traditional expectations against those of "bad faith" who would wil-
fully ignore them or challenge the system. In this role, law is the guardian of
the status quo. We capture that role in our contemporary term "law and
order". At the same time, law is the only device capable of bringing instant
moral and coercive authority to bear on behalf of new expectations and of
challenging the authority of organizations and markets. Thus, it is also the
most powerful device for politically instantiated change. 1
This ambiguity has also been a puzzle to theorists of social change, who have
been divided over the possibilities of enlisting legal resources in struggles
for social justice. Amongst those whose aspirations can be generally termed
"leftist", the prevailing view has been that the law is designed to serve and
protect the interests of the dominant groups in society; that it reflects the
ideologies of those dominant groups and functions as an instrument for the
enactment and enforcement of those ideologies. While marginal reforms can
be achieved by working within its institutions and structures, fundamental
change can only be brought about by the collective exertion of previously
untapped political and economic power by large-scale social movements.
Legal resources can be usefully deployed in rearguard actions designed to
shield these movements and their leaders from excesses of state repression.
This view is generally associated with theories of social change predicated
on a belief in a historical sequence of types of social organization, each with
its distinct "deep structure". According to the most prominent branch of such
evolutionary deep-structure theory-Marxism and its derivatives-the cul-
tural, political and legal formations of a society are more or less determined
1. Phillip B. Heymann, "A Law Enforcement Model for Legal Services" (1989), 23
Clearinghouse Review 254, at 256.
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by the material, economic relations of that society. The fundamental
economic structure places limits on the extent to which change can occur at
other levels of organization (i.e. cultural, political and legal), and is relatively
immune from being changed itself by pressure applied at those other levels.
In such theories, the possibilities for individual human agency in relation
to social change are starkly limited. Because the historical sequence of
types of social organization is thought to be governed by certain laws of
social evolution, the socially conscious actor is portrayed as having to
choose between falling into step with the forward march of history (a
choice equated with the movement towards true liberty, justice, etc.) or
impeding it (either purposefully or inadvertently). Wherever one sees an
apparent opportunity for reducing, even only marginally or locally, the
power of some people to reduce others to a state of dependency and
exploitation, one is therefore confronted with a series of dilemmas; or
perhaps one basic dilemma which can be described in several different
ways: First, if gradual reform can never surpass the limits set by the basic
structure of social division, there is always the danger that the reformer
is merely contributing to the hold of that basic structure by softening
(either actually or only apparently) the conflicts which it would otherwise
engender. This works against the arrow of history by allowing people to
think that the social structure is more just or legitimate than it really is
and thereby reducing the pressure for fundamental change. Second, those
who benefit by the underlying economic distribution of power must be
taken to understand this; thus through their control over the terms of
cultural, political and legal interaction they will be able to effectively
co-opt reformist efforts into unwitting collaboration in maintaining the
essential elements of the status quo. Third, there is the danger.that
reformist goals will divert scarce energy, time and resources away from
the more important task of building broad-based collective actions aimed
at intensifying the conflict at the more fundamental, structural level. 2
2. For variations on these themes with respect to the usefulness of Charter litigation to
progressive movements, see e.g. Judy Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The
Possibilities Of and the Limits To the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist
Struggles" (1989), 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; Andrew Petter, "Immaculate Decep-
tion: The Charter's Hidden Agenda", [1987?] The Advocate 857; Allan Hutchinson
& Andrew Petter, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter"
(1988), 38 U.T.L.J. 278; and with respect to the function of legal forms under
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Finally,the realization of this causes the aware agent for social change to adopt
an instrumental and sometimes cynical stance towards reformist move-
ments-she will tend to see participation in them as instrumentally useful
only insofar as they may help bring about the conditions under which
(according to her guiding theory) the transformation of one form of society
to another can take place. Thus she may believe that those with whom she is
temporarily allied in localized or modest efforts are actually misguided by
the illusion that the immediate goals they seek are worthwhile for their own
sake.
The main problem posed by belief in evolutionary structural theories of social
change, however, is the fact that history has refused to bear them out. 3 This
failure of theory has induced a malaise on the left, a discomforting fear that
one can never be sure of what to do without the guidance of such a theory-
the fear of getting lost in a tangle of particularities without a compass that
points constantly towards the goal. It may also reflect a feeling that without
the guarantee of the inevitability of success that such theory hoped to provide,
the risk of futility is overwhelmingly high. Hence the ultimate paralysing
dilemma: anything within reach seems hardly worth fighting for, and any-
thing worth fighting for seems hopelessly unattainable.
This paper is an account of the experience of a progressive movement which
hints at the possibility of a different way of thinking about social change-a
way of thinking that replaces the problem of aligning theory and practice with
an immersion in practical, localized struggles which nevertheless can be
guided by general principles. In particular, it suggests that a "bottom line"
for the strategy and tactics of social justice should be a refusal to divorce
means from ends-that whatever long-term utopian vision one has of a
transformed society, one needs to look for opportunities to live out and realize
elements of that vision, however fragmentarily or imperfectly, in the "here
and now" of political and personal interaction. It suggests, also, that such
capitalism, R. Weitzer, "Law and Legal Ideology: Contributions to the Genesis and
Reproduction of Capitalism" (1980), 24 Berk.J.Soc. 137; Harry Glasbeek & Michael
Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984), 2 Socialist Studies 84.
3. See, e.g., Roberto Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 109-117.
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efforts need not be limited by the assumptions of deep-structure social theory
because experience shows that there is no clear division between conflicts
that take place within a given context and conflicts over the basic terms of
that context.
This story is about a struggle for "access to justice", a phrase that can stand
for freedom from exploitation, powerlessness and poverty or only for the
right to have a lawyer tell you that the law doesn't recognize your right to be
free from those things.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMUNITY LEGAL CLINICS
IN ONTARIO
A. BACKGROUND
The first publicly-funded legal aid program in Ontario was inaugurated
by the Legal Aid Act of 1966.4 Before that, the ability of persons who
could not afford lawyers' fees to obtain legal representation was depend-
ent on the charitable "pro bono" work of the private bar. In the report
leading up to the implementation of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, it was
recognized that "... legal aid should form part of the administration of
justice in its broadest sense. It is no longer a charity but a right."'5
The basis of the Plan was the idea that equal access to justice could be
achieved by making available to the poor the same lawyers and legal services
as were available to the well-to-do individuals and corporations traditionally
served by the private bar.
It became apparent relatively quickly that this approach left almost totally
unaddressed vast areas of need for legal advice and representation. Apart
from criminal and family law matters, 6 most of the types of legal assistance
required by poor people were unrecognized by the Plan7 and involved matters
4. S.O. 1966, c. 80. This was the first such plan in Canada; the rest of the Provinces and
Territories followed suit over the next decade or so.
5. Ontario, Report of the Joint Committee on LegalAid (March 1965) at 97.
6. For example, of legally-aided cases completed in the year ending March 31, 1970,
90% involved litigation and of these 85% involved criminal or family law matters:
Ontario LegalAid Plan Annual Report, 1970, at 14.
7. For example, the Plan specifically excluded from coverage proceedings for the enfor-
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in which very little expertise or experience was to be found among the private
bar. Furthermore, many problems were not recognized as galy the people
affected themselves. These problems-in the shape of hostile landlords,
unfair welfare officials and so on-were too woven into the fabric of
everyday life to fit the traditional model of non-poor legal clients, the people
of whom it has been said that:
[i]n so far as the law is concerned, they lead harmonious and settled private
lives; except for their business involvements, their lives usually do not
demand the services of a lawyer. Occasionally, one of them gets hit by a car,
or decides to buy a house, or lets his dog bite someone.8
Even where poor people identified their problems as legal, they were ex-
tremely unlikely to consider the possibility of legal resources being brought
to bear on their behalf. A myriad of physical and psychological barriers stood
in the way.9 Lawyers were often regarded (not inaccurately) as being on "the
other side". For these and other reasons, the goal of providing equal- access
to justice to rich and poor could not be well served by a legal aid system that
was based on the norm of the fee-paying client.
B. THE EARLY CLINIC MOVEMENT
In Ontario, the response to this deficiency was the creation of alternative legal
services by community organizations, self-help groups and sympathetic law
faculties and students. Operating with or without lawyers, and with unreliable
funding from an assortment of sources ranging from the federal Justice
Department to the U.S. Ford Foundation, these new "legal clinics" took a
quite different approach from that followed by the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
Among the main elements which characterized this approach (although they
were by no means all shared by all the groups and individuals involved in the
field) were the recognition of the following guiding principles:
cement of landlords' obligations: LegalAidAct, 1966, S.O. 1966, c. 80, s.15.
8. Stephen Wexler, "Practicing Law for Poor People" (1970), 79 Yale LJ. 1049 at
1049.
9. For an account of some of these barriers, see Larry Taman, The Legal Services Con-
troversy: An Examination of the Evidence, (Ottawa: National Council of Welfare
1971) at 13-21.
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1. The provision of high-quality services in relation to matters affecting
poor people could be achieved only by relative specialization-and
that expertise in these matters, just as in the areas traditionally served
by the private bar, was more likely to be attained by a small group of
people devoting their full-time attention to specific types of problems
and sharing the results of their research and experience than by
lawyers engaged in quite different areas of practice who take the oc-
casional "poverty law" case.
2. The "one-shot" case-by-case approach was wholly inadequate to
respond to the legal problems that attended poverty because these
problems were mostly of a systemic nature. Access to the courts meant
nothing if one had no legally recognized right to enforce once inside.
Even where legal remedies were possible, they would not be realized
unless the people who could benefit from those remedies were aware
of them and were willing to assert them. Thus it was necessary both to
engage in aggressive outreach and educational activities to encourage
potential clients to attempt to assert their claims and, as well, to
develop organizations that could serve as a voice for the articulation of
the interests of poor people with a view to changing the policies, struc-
tures and laws which operated against those interests.
3. The services provided by clinics must be responsive to the needs of
the communities being served. This objective could not be realized
under the traditional social service or professional/client relationship
models, which tended to reinforce the disempowerment of poor
people by denying their ability to make choices and take action on
their own behalf. These traditional conceptions of provision of ser-
vice increased people's dependency on "experts" whose assessments
of what was in the best interests of their clients was often seriously
mistaken and whose training and social location often led them to
narrow definitions of the problems and possible courses of action.
The new clinic movement, therefore, looked for models in which the
ideal of "user control" could best be realized-ways of involving, to
the greatest degree possible, members of the client communities in
the design and delivery of the clinics' services.
One prominent feature of most of the early clinics was the employment of
"community legal workers"; generally persons without formal legal training
but often having a background in grass-roots community organizing activities
or coming from the client groups being served by the clinics. It was not, at
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first, a matter of recruitment and training by the clinics of persons from the
client community to act as community legal workers; rather, the community legal
workers were often people who, having achieved some expertise in a particular
legal area through their own efforts in dealing with problems they were personal-
ly experiencing, had gone on to organize self-help groups around these issues in
which this expertise could be shared. These people and organizations were not
the creations, but rather the creators, of the first clinics.
The community legal worker model was seen to be an important embodiment of
the principles outlined above. First, by focussing on particular practical legal issues,
they were able to achieve high levels of expertise not found anywhere else,
including the private bar. Their activities would often revolve around a set of
institutions and entitlements based in particular statutory provisions; for example,
unemployment insurance, general welfare assistance, refugee claims, tenants'
rights. Not only were they able to become highly conversant with these statutes
and the jurisprudence surrounding them, but they also attained a great deal of
familiarity with the relatively informalized or "discretionary" aspects of policies
and procedures practised by the agencies and tribunals administering them-the
kind of familiarity with "the law in action" that, as most lawyers know, is only
learned through practice and which can make the difference between merely
technical competence and truly effective advocacy. Because lawyers were general-
ly much less familiar with these substantive areas and specialized agencies,
community legal workers could usually beat them at their own game.
Secondly, the model of the community legal worker emphasized skills and
experience relevant to the activities of community legal education and organiz-
ing necessary in the attempt to address problems at a more systemic level than
was possible under the individual case, litigation-based approach supported by
the legal aid plan. Furthermore, they were more willing than were lawyers
generally to engage in such activities and to see them as at least equally important
and legitimate as litigation. This idea was stated bluntly by a group of community
legal workers: "A community legal worker is often better suited than a lawyer
to achieve the long range goal of social change because they do not have a vested
interest in maintaining the legal system and the status quo."'10
10. From a "Statement by a group of community legal workers", (undated) prepared for
a conference workshop (time, place and name of conference unknown, but probably
around 1975-76 in Toronto).
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Thirdly, community legal workers were more likely to share with members
of client groups similarities in life experience, social status and thus attitude
to the status quo than were most lawyers. As a result, they were better
equipped to understand the situations clients found themselves in, and the
features of their lives that formed the contexts within which their "legal"
problems arose. They saw themselves as playing a facilitative role directed
towards the achievement of self-definition and empowerment of client
groups rather than the role of the expert in whose hands clients place
responsibility for the solution of their problems. The socialization and train-
ing of lawyers was seen as being less conducive to the formation of such
attitudes, although there were certainly lawyers involved in clinics who were
exceptions to the general rule.
The other operational feature of clinics that was tied to the implementation
of the principles noted above was their independence from the official Legal
Aid Plan (run by the Law Society) and from government. But while the Plan
did not direct or interfere in the operations of the clinics, neither did it provide
any financial support. As will be discussed below, the issue of independence
was to become increasingly crucial and problematic after the advent of public
funding for community legal clinics. But the early clinics saw independence
from government (and from the Law Society, which they did not regard as
significantly distinct from government) as essential to their effectiveness.
Independence was crucial in two distinct, but interrelated ways: (1) It was an
important value for the same reasons that an independent bar generally is
considered to be necessary to the ideals of democratic government and the
rule of law-reasons made all the more apparent in the case of clinics whose
activities, more often than not, placed them in an adversarial role with respect
to government departments, agencies and, in law reform and organizing
activities, the political party in office itself. Thus, independence was neces-
sary to ensure, in both appearance and reality, that clinics were able to act
faithfully in the interests of their clients free from conflicting loyalties,
pressures or duties. (2) Independence also had a more positive and global
aspect: it was essential in order to ensure that clinics could continue to be
guided by the principle of client influence, and ultimately control, over the
design and implementation of their services-input which meant a focus on
organizing, lobbying, and other forms of collective action instead of the
narrower individual client-based mandate of the Legal Aid Plan.
In accordance with this commitment to grass-roots control and account-
ability, clinics began to develop the model which, in form at least, continues
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to be followed today: the community-based Board of Directors. These Boards
were drawn largely from the communities served by the clinics, they were
chosen by election of the memberships of the clinics (generally, anyone
eligible for service or supportive of the clinic's goals and objectives could
become a member, and membership was usually actively encouraged among
client groups), and they would be responsible for setting the policies of the
clinic and directing its staff. The Board's control was to be real and would
mean, "...having power to hire the staff most suitable to the community;
having the power to define its own and its staff's responsibilities; having the
power to direct the 'style' of the service provided, and most important, having
the power to establish priorities for the organization that reflect social/politi-
cal/legal objectives for reform and change." 11
With control came the need for accountability, and the building of democratic
organizations of client constituencies from whom Board members would be
drawn, and to whom they would be responsible, was seen as the best way to
meet this requirement. The model of staff control, even with the institution
of the community legal worker and however high a degree of rapport and
understanding existed between clinic staff and clients, was not seen as
adequate for true accountability and community control.
C. THE ADVENT OF PUBLIC FUNDING
Growing awareness of the deficiencies of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan led to
the appointment in January, 1974 of the Osler Task Force on Legal Aid. In its
Report of November, 1974, the Task Force made certain recommendations
concerning what it called "neighbourhood legal aid clinics". Most significant-
ly, it recommended that they be funded through the Legal Aid Plan (which was
to be run by a statutory non-profit corporation named Legal Aid Ontario whose
Board of Directors would be comprised mainly of equal numbers of appointees
of the Law Society and the Provincial Cabinet). It recommended that some of
the then-existing clinics in Metropolitan Toronto, which were "independently
operated under direction of community organizations or well intentioned
individuals", be "invited to come within the ambit of the Plan". 12
11. Ibid., Pre-conference workshop report on community control", prepared by "a group
of community members of Boards of Directors of Community Clinics".
12. Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid, Part I, (Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney-
General, 1974) (Chair: Mr. Justice Osler) p. 112.
The Community Legal Clinic Movement in Ontario:
However, the role envisaged for the community organizations that had estab-
lished independent clinics was to be "exclusively advisory". Decisions as to the
establishment of further clinics were to be made by the Board of Legal Aid
Ontario, and such newly-created clinics would be "encouraged", not required,
to establish Community Advisory Boards made up of lawyers practicing in and
"lay persons" residing in the geographical community served by the clinic. The
Board of Legal Aid Ontario, and not the community groups or advisory boards,
was to have control over appointment of staff to the clinics, establishment of
staff requirements, special projects and priorities, and power to impose any
further terms and conditions of funding that it considered advisable. 13
For the people involved in the early clinic movement, the Report, despite its lack
of support of any strong version of the principle of community control, was most
notable for the hope that it held out for relatively secure funding. The clinics'
lobby group, Action on Legal Aid, precursor of the Ontario Association of Legal
Clinics, apparently gave qualified support to the recommendations of the Task
Force, probably based on a perception that the maintenance of community input
through advisory boards together with the vesting of control over the Legal Aid
Plan in the proposed new statutory corporation, in which neither the Law Society
nor the provincial government had a decisive voice, would assure a sufficient
degree of independence for clinics. 14
The Ontario Government responded with the proclamation of the Clinical
Funding Regulation, which authorized the Legal Aid Plan to fund "inde-
pendent community-based clinical delivery systems". 15 The term "inde-
pendent" was not defined; its meaning was highly ambiguous in light of the
fact that other recommendations of the Task Force, notably the creation of a
statutory legal aid corporation with extensive control over clinic operations
and the relegation of community boards to an advisory role, were not
13. Ibid. at 123-24.
14. This is largely conjecture on my part; see: Mary Jane Mossman, "Community Legal
Clinics in Ontario" (1983), 3 Windsor Y.B. Access Just 375, at p. 382, where she
notes that: "In a brief to the Ontario Government, the early clinics supported the
Report's recommendations and urged the creation of a new legal aid corporation in
which neither the Law Society nor government representatives should have any spe-
cial status. However, the brief is also important for identifying the fiscal dilemma
then faced by the early clinics..." [quotation from brief and footnotes omitted].
15. 0. Reg. 160/76, s. 147.
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implemented. Perhaps predictably, the views of the Law Society and those
of the clinics diverged sharply on this question.16
In the meantime, tensions between the clinics and the Law Society had been
fanned considerably with the "defunding" of the "People & Law" clinic, a
move that many involved in the clinic movement saw as reflecting a policy
decision by the Clinical Funding Committee not to fund law reform activities.
The summary way in which the defunding decision had been reached (the
Regulation required no formal notice or hearing and none had been provided)
was regarded as unacceptable interference with the autonomy of the clinic's
community-based Board of Directors and brought home to clinics the ease
with which the Committee's control over the flow of money could translate
into a veto power over clinic policies and practices. These concerns led to
the appointment, in June 1978, of a Commission on Clinical Funding to be
conducted by Mr. Justice Samuel Grange.
D. THE GRANGE REPORT
The Commission's mandate was to make recommendations for "improvements
to the Regulation and its administration by the Law Society of Upper Canada"
and for "firm guidelines to govern the working relationship between the clinical
delivery systems and the Clinical Funding Committee". It was instructed further
To have regard in all of the foregoing to the need for the independence of
clinical delivery systems, funded under the Regulation, the need for account-
ability for the expenditure of public funds, the need to maintain good stand-
ards of service to the public, the need to deliver service at reasonable cost to
the taxpayer, and the need for orderly growth and development of the clini-
cal portion of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.17
16. In a letter to the Attorney-General dated May 10, 1978, the Clinical Funding Com-
mittee of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan urged the speedy resolution of these disputes by
a third party, saying tactfully that "... until the rules of the relationship [between the
Committee and the clinics] are defined, full co-operation between all parties will not
be realized.... The system would be impaired if the Clinical Funding Committee and
the Clinics were forced to continue their relationship under the current regulation
into another fiscal year." (Ontario: Report of the Commission on Clinical Funding,
(1978) (Hon. S.G.M. Grange, Commissioner), Appendix 'F') (hereinafter "Grange
Report").
17. Ibid. at Appendix "A".
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After hearing from almost everyone involved in the clinic movement, as well
as from the Law Society and the Clinical Funding Committee, the Commis-
sion issued a report that was very strongly supportive of the original vision
of community controlled clinics, with a broad mandate which included
organizing and law reform activities. With respect to the latter, the Report
had this to say:
"... the field [of law reform] is not unknown to the private Bar in its service
to its clients and it is perhaps even more the proper concern of lawyers who
serve the poor because the poor are less articulate and their concerns less
often heard by the legislators. While there may have once been doubt of the
propriety, it does not exist now. Many clinics, to a greater or lesser degree,
engage in some form of law reform activity including lobbying of legisla-
tures and organizing of their clients for the purpose. ... The definition of
'legal and para-legal services' I have set out above is intended to encompass
law reform." 18
The Report also affirmed the need for real community control, and not just
an advisory role for clinic boards; the Clinical Funding Committee's inter-
vention was to be limited to exceptional circumstances:
... to the extent that the poor have now placed their confidence in the clinics,
much of the credit must go to the strong role played in their development
and operation by the boards of directors. If the movement is to develop and
progress with the continuing confidence of the clients, that role must not be
eroded. The boards must continue to govern the affairs of the clinics, both as
to policy and administration, bject only to accountability for the public funds
advanced and for the legal competence of the services rendered. ... I think
the matter should be viewed in this light: the Boards have control over the
operations of their clinics and the Committee may interfere in that control
only if it can bring the interference within one or other of the public's
legitimate spheres of interest. 19
Other recommendations were aimed at instilling the values of procedural
"due process" into the decision-making function of the Committee. The
Committee was to have under its general direction a staff who would be
responsible for making all initial funding decisions. The Committee was to
assume an appellate jurisdiction with respect to these decisions, with an
appeal lying as of right for any established clinic whose funding the clinic
18. Ibid at 15-16.
19. Ibid. at 22 [emphasis added].
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funding staff proposed to reduce. In its appellate role the Committee would
be required to hold hearings to which the atutory Powers Procedure Actould
apply.20 The composition of the Committee was also addressed: there were
to be five members; two representatives of the Law Society, one of "the
Attorney-General and the public" and two of the clinics themselves. 21
With the proclamation in June, 1979 of a new Clinic Funding Regulation 22
most of Grange's recommendations were implemented. A significant excep-
tion was the absence of designated clinic representatives on the Clinic Funding
Committee. The new Committee was to consist of three appointees of the Law
Society and two of the Attorney-General, with the proviso that at least two
members of the Committee be persons previously "associated" with com-
munity legal clinics. And significantly, too, the new Regulation provided for
the funding of "independent" clinics without defining the scope of that
independence against the Committee's power to make policy with respect to
funding and to impose terms and conditions on the use of public funds by
clinics.
E. THE EROSION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL
At the time of the Grange Report, the public funding of clinics through the Ontario
Legal Aid Plan was already in a trajectory of explosive growth as existing
community-based self-help groups took the opportunity for obtaining secure
funding bases and expanded resources. 23 Since then the growth in funding, while
it has not been as rapid as in those initial years, has consistently outstripped the
growth of the original fee-for-service component of the legal aid budget, and that
of the Attorney-General's budget as a whole, with the result that there are now 67
publicly-funded community legal clinics with a total budget of approximately $25
20. Ibid. at 35-36, 41, 43.
21. Ibid. at 37-41. But the sense in which Committee members were to be "repre-
sentative" was vague, since the Attorney-General was to have the sole power to ap-
point all five.
22. 0. Reg. 391/79. The mandate of the clinics was described, in s. 148(2), as the
provision of "legal and paralegal services or both, including activities reasonably
designed to encourage access to such services or to further such services and services
designed solely to promote the legal welfare of a community."
23. Funding levels had grown from about $913,000 for 13 clinics in 1976-77 to almost
$2.6 million for 35 clinics in 1977-78 (Grange Report, supra, n. 16, at Appendix
"E").
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million. 24 The Clinic Funding Committee 25 now directs a full-time staff of 9, who
have responsibility for initial decisions respecting funding of new and existing
clinics. There is now almost complete geographical coverage of the entire Province
by clinics, and several more specialized clinics have been funded to serve "com-
munities of interest". 26 By these measures, the clinic movement has been a
spectacular success, probably far beyond the expectations of its originators. But
there is another side to this growth which reflects an underlying dissension
among the various participants and observers concerning the role of com-
munity boards and, relatedly but more broadly, the mission of the clinics
themselves.
Perhaps as an inevitable result of the lack of any legislative definition of the
word "independent" as applied to clinics and of any precise delimitation of
the scope of the Clinic Funding Committee's powers, there continued to be
conflicts between the Committee and the established clinics over these issues.
These conflicts reached a culmination point as a group of lawyers employed
in some of the newer clinics began to campaign for a dominant role for
lawyer-directors within the Ontario Association of Legal Clinics (OALC),
the umbrella lobbying and information-sharing organization of the clinic
movement.
With moral and tactical support from the Clinic Funding Committee and its
staff, this group of clinic lawyers put forward a proposal for a thoroughgoing
restructuring of the OALC which reflected their view that lawyer-directors
were the appropriate people to direct the work of the clinics, to identify
training requirements and so on. The proposal was defeated at a general
meeting of the OALC which voted instead to initiate a process of deliberation
over the issues raised which would allow for wider participation and cooler
thinking than was possible in the crisis atmosphere in which the proposal had
24. This is the amount requested by the Clinic Funding Committee for the fiscal year
1988-89 and, at the time of this writing, had not yet received final approval from the
Attorney-General.
25. As it is now called-the "-al" was dropped with the new Regulation which followed
the Grange Report.
26. Examples of such communities of interest served by specialized clinics include
children and youth, residential tenants, Chinese & South-East Asian immigrants,
non-unionized workers (occupational health & safety matters), native communities
and reserves, differently-abled persons and injured workers.
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been brought forward. The response of the Clinic Funding Committee was
astonishing to most participants-rather than awaiting the outcome of the
democratic and participatory process which the OALC had set in motion; or,
better yet, making no response at all, the Chairman of the Committee
announced to stunned observers outside the meeting room that the OALC
would be defunded, effective the following business day. And so it was. It
was, in some respects, a replay of the People & Law fiasco of the early
days-no notice of intention to defund had been served on the Association
and no hearing was afforded it either before or after the decision was taken.
The Clinic Funding Committee had, however, made it fairly clear that they
would be displeased if the lawyer-directors' proposal were not approved; thus
the vote to reject it was in part an act of defiance against what was seen as
an improper attempt by the Committee to interfere with the Association's
internal decision-making process.
Two lessons are to be drawn froin this episode in the history of the clinic
movement. One was that the Clinic Funding Committee, as representatives of
the Law Society and the Attorney-General, wielded through their control over
funding decisions the ultimate power to dictate terms to the clinics, and there was
no apparent limit to the degree of interference which could be effected through the
exercise of this power. Thus it became a serious question whether anything at all
remained of the "independence" of the clinic Boards. The other lesson was that
there was division within the clinic movement itself over the fundamental
philosophy behind the movement-indeed, this division was reflected rhetorically
in the question of whether clinics any longer constituted a "movement" at all, or
whether, as some would have it, they were now a "system". This division was in
large measure responsible for making possible the overt interference in the internal
affairs of the OALC by Legal Aid officials, and it is therefore worth conjecturing
about its causes.
Even during the period of rapid growth, the increase each year in the overall
funding level for clinics was insufficient to meet the demand placed on it by
existing and newly-forming groups who wanted clinics established to serve their
constituencies. The clinic funding staff was therefore required to prioritize
among the applications received each year, and gradually a pattern of stand-
ardized evaluative factors emerged upon which such decisions were based. There
was thus a strong, even irresistible, pressure on applicants to make their
proposals conform to the standard model, often at the cost of sacrificing
responsiveness to particular community needs that had been identified.
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This standard model was in several important respects quite different from
characteristics typically found in the early clinics of diverse origins. For
example, this model excluded the possibility of any of the kinds of collective
or egalitarian staffing structures which were common among the older
clinics, in favour of a traditional hierarchical arrangement with an executive
director at the top of the chain of command. The model was heavily lawyer-
based: the executive director had to be a lawyer and, while the original clinics
relied more heavily on community legal workers than on lawyers, the
standard model's staffing component consisted of two lawyers, two
secretaries, and one community legal worker. Later versions of the model
sometimes included community legal workers. Board composition was also
a critical factor-the funders wanted to see that the proposed clinic had the
support of the community, including the local Bar Association 27-and the
presence of one or more lawyers and other professionals on the Board was a
de facto requirement. Perhaps most importantly, members of the clinic
funding staff routinely insinuated themselves into, and often took over
completely, the process of hiring staff for newly-funded clinics. Thus, over-
all, the persons hired, particularly for the sensitive executive-director posi-
tions, tended to share the funder's vision of the role and nature of the clinic
"system". Those development groups who started with high hopes of effec-
tive community control were quickly disillusioned and disempowered even
before their clinics first opened their doors.
Largely as a result of the funder's ability to virtually dictate the design of
each new clinic, there grew up a large contingent of clinics which, while
ostensibly community-based, in reality behaved much like a series of local
offices of a centralized bureaucracy. With their acquiescence and coopera-
tion, the Clinic Funding Committee and its staff assumed ever greater control
over almost every aspect of their operations. The clinic Boards were in many
cases reduced to the kind of advisory role that had been envisaged by the
Osler Task Force Report. Representatives of client groups lost interest in
participating as their control was eroded and as Board meetings became
increasingly dominated by the need to deal with the avalanche of paper they
27. This was well demonstrated by their refusal, for several years in a row, to fund a
proposed clinic in Peterborough for the sole apparent reason that it was vehemently
opposed by the district Bar Association, and despite the fact that the proposal was
ranked very highly on all other counts.
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received each month from the clinic funding staff. Boards were manoeuvered
into a role of unpaid middle management-they bore the brunt of personnel
and other problems within the clinics while the funder refused to provide
them with funds with which to access resources and advice. They were sent
into bargaining sessions with unionized staff with their hands tied by man-
datory terms and conditions of funding.28 They had to make tough decisions
about service priorities in a high-pressure atmosphere, knowing that if
problems developed the funders would be there to call them to account and
to second-guess the wisdom of their every move. It is no wonder that many
of the more recently funded clinics uncritically accepted the funding staff's
directives with respect to almost every detail of clinic operations.
By the mid-1980's the clinics that had formed the backbone of the movement
in its beginning now found themselves outnumbered by what came to be
known as the "Kentucky Fried Clinics", and the principle of community
control had become an endangered species. An ominous sign of the times was
this remark by the Ontario Attorney-General:
I think that one issue that remains on the decks is the community role. I think
the community has some concerns about what its role is. I think the Law
Society and the lawyers also have some concerns about what that role is and
I'm not sure that we have really reached the end of that exercise.
29
mI. CONCLUSION: ENDS & MEANS
The conflict between the original and the "Kentucky Fried" models of legal
clinics illustrates the conundrum of co-optation and the dangers of separating
ends from means. The apparent lack of success of the community-based
approach is easily explained in terms of, and is perhaps predicted by, theories
of social change which assume a qualitative distinction between reform and
revolution. According to these theories, the underlying structures of political
and economic power are relatively immune from changes and adjustments
28. This was recognized by the Ontario Labour Relations Board when it made a declara-
tion under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act naming the Ontario Legal Aid Plan as
a co-employer in two out of the three clinics in respect of which an application was
made by the union: O.P.S.E.U. v. O.L.A.P. et al, 1989] OLRB Rep. Aug. 862; ap-
plication for judicial review dismissed by Div. Ct., January, 1990. O.L.A.P. is cur-
rently seeking leave to appeal from the Div. Ct. decision.
29. From an interview with Ian Scott in Equity (Ontario Association of Legal Clinics,
December, 1987), 3.
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which may be brought about at the level of dependent or derivative
phenomena-what Marxian theory calls the superstructure. Thus govern-
ment support for projects like legal clinics-projects which, on their face,
are directed against established power relations-can be understood as ac-
tually reinforcing the status quo in several ways. First, according to this
sceptical view, clinics provide a means of channeling and containing forces
which might otherwise threaten to escalate into serious political challenges
to prevailing power relations. Grassroots movements are invited to join the
highly formalized and technical game of expressing demands in terms of
desired legal regulation. The clinics, as the means of such expression,
themselvesbecomecalcifiedminibureaucracieswhoseestablishedoperating
procedures and vested interest in self-preservation serves as a front-line
filtration system against radical claims. Whenever clinic activities overstep
the bounds of polite supplication (in law reform efforts), neutral information
providing (in community legal education) and professional norms of devo-
tion to established procedures (in the more traditional litigation-based ad-
vocacy work), they can be reigned in through the imposition of terms and
conditions of funding. The supposed inevitability of this kind of limitation is
summed up in the maxim, "Who pays the piper, calls the tune."
Second, public support for progressive projects enhances the legitimacy
of prevailing social arrangements by providing a symbol of equality. If
poor people can be said to enjoy access to the institutions that make and
apply the law, then the outcomes produced by those institutions are
sanctified as being free of the systemic bias that would be produced by an
obvious and persistent pattern of unequal access. This sense of legitimacy
is only confirmed by the occasional successes achieved by the poor in
describing and asserting rights within that framework. These effects work
to reinforce the existing structure by diverting the view of its potential
critics and disempowered people themselves away from the overall injustice
of the system and fixing in the public mind the imagery of equality and
justice.30 Aprobably unintended, but quite accurate, description of this aspect
30. For a powerful account of the role of formal equality of access in legitimating op-
pressive laws, albeit in a quite different context, see Douglas Hay, "Property,
Authority and the Criminal Law", in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J.G. Rule, E.P.
Thompson and C. Winslow, eds. Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth-CenturyEngland, New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) 17 at 32-39.
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of the state's interest in making available clinic resources to the poor was
provided by an Attorney-General of Ontario, one whose personal enthusiasm
for legal clinics was largely responsible for the growth in provincial funding
from the late 1970's to the mid-1980's. He said:
The clinics... can reach out to advise people of their rights. They take law to
the people. ... In doing all of this, the clinics help convince the poor that
they have a stake in this society.3 1
In the context of publicly-funded clinics, the tension between the opposing
roles of reinforcing or challenging the status quo is focussed on the conflict-
ing demands of client community control on one hand and the interests of the
funding source on the other. To the extent that clinics take seriously the
pursuit of real power for poor people, they will become targets for defund-
ing.32 Therefore it is important to ask what is the basis, if any, for the
protection of the independence of clinics and of their ability to withstand the
pressures, exercised through the funding power, which conflict with their
duty to advance the interests of their clients.33
It has been argued that such independence is assured through the unique
funding structure which provides that specific funding decisions are made by
the Clinic Funding Committee-a body independent of the governmental
source of funds-while the overall allocations of legal aid funding as between
31. Hon. R. Roy McMurtry, "Notes for a Statement to the Ontario Legislature Standing
Committee on the Administration of Justice", December 1, 1982, 30-31 [emphasis
added].
32. For an account of the blatantly political defunding of a university-based clinic by the
Nova Scotia government, see Joan Dawkins, "Living to Fight Another Day: The
Story of Dalhousie Legal Aid" (1988), 3 J. L. & Social Pol. 1. See also Larsen,
"Seven Years with Legal Aid (1972-79): A Personal View of Some Events and
Background Literature" (1981), 11 Man. L.J. 237.
33. There may also be pressures, due to the division of funding responsibilities between
the federal and provincial governments, against the deployment of clinic resources in
the very areas of civil law which had been neglected by the certificate program: see
Mossman, "Legal Services and Community Development: Competing or Compatible
Activities" (1984), in Community Legal Worker Forum Resource Manual, Ontario
Association of Legal Clinics, January 19, 1985. Professor Mossman also rightly
points out in that paper that the cost-benefit style of program evaluation employed by
government creates a subtle pressure in favour of case-by-case delivery of legal ser-
vices rather than community organizing activities, which do not generate impressive
statistical reports.
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the clinics and the fee-for-service (certificate) program are made by the
Attorney-General-a party who does not share the Law Society's interest in
favour of the certificate program whereby funds flow directly to its mem-
bers.34 While these factors are important, at least in avoiding a technical
appearance of fiduciary conflicts of interest, this funding structure is clearly
insufficient to avoid the more subtle interference and co-optation which has
been observed as a long-term trend in the movement. As mentioned earlier,
from the perspective of clinic client communities, there is not a great
distinction in the political orientation of members of the provincial Cabinet
and the Benchers. Neither the legal nor the political establishments can be
expected to show much dedication to attacking systemic inequality and
exploitation; on the contrary, they are both perceived (and not inaccurately,
I suggest) as having an interest in the maintenance of the very institutions
that disempower and oppress poor people. And as repeated experience,
exemplified by the defunding of the OALC discussed above, has shown, even
the presence on the Committee of individuals who have some personal
sympathy for what they perceive to be the goals of the clinics, is not a reliable
assurance that the principles of community control will be respected. Such
persons, however well-intentioned, are not in a position to evaluate and
second-guess the decisions of community Boards because of their very
different perspectives, biases and assumptions about social change and the
role of legal advocacy. Thus I conclude that the presence of a funding
"barrier", as in the present funding structure, is a necessary but clearly
insufficient condition for the maintenance of community control.
The provision in the funding Regulation of a more detailed definition of the
scope of the Committee's disciplinary powers is desirable, but would also be
insufficient for similar reasons. At minimum, the Committee's power would
have to include some formulation of its responsibility for the proper expen-
diture of public funds. This would necessarily involve defining the outer
limits of permissible clinic activity-a matter on which there is unlikely to
be any consensus among the various participants. It has been suggested that
the Committee has no jurisdiction over questions of quality or competence
of the services provided by clinics, these being matters of professional
34. Mossman, "Community Legal Clinics and Independent Legal Services" (1982), [un-
published]. See also Mossman, supra, note 14.
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standards administered by the Law Society through its Discipline Committee.
But the professional norms enforced by the bar were hardly designed with
clinic clients in mind-indeed, clinics have been obliged to seek ad hoc
exemptions from various Rules of Professional Conduct which would have
greatly inhibited their effectiveness. 35 While exemptions have been obtained,
there is probably a general suspicion on the part of the Law Society that
clinics and clinic lawyers are pushing up against the limits of acceptable
professional conduct.36 Another factor that makes this backdrop of profes-
sional norms troublesome for clinics is the promotion by clinic adversaries
(notably certain large landlords and their organizations) of a general policy
of making formal complaints against clinics and clinic staff as part of their
tactics in every major litigational encounter. These complaints usually allege
some combination of professional misconduct and misappropriation of
public funds, and, although usually groundless, have a serious cumulative
effect both on the resources of the clinics which are diverted in responding
to these accusations and on the level of mutual trust between the Clinic
Funding Committee (which is required to investigate every such complaint,
no matter how frivolous or vexatious) and the targetted clinics.
All these suggested factors for the protection of the integrity of community
control of clinics are ultimately inadequate because they place reliance on
the self-interested support or mere toleration of the movement on the part of
established power centres such as the Law Society and the provincial govern-
ment. What these factors are lacking, and what, in my view, is the most
important potential source of strength for the clinic movement lies in the
guiding principle which is common to both the ends and means of clinic
practice-the empowerment of constituent communities. Such empower-
ment is often thought of only in terms of the substantive legal goals of the
clinics, but the means by which these goals are to be pursued-the ideal of
client control-also needs to be conceived of as an exercise in empowerment.
The various aspects of the design of service delivery which are aimed at
35. For example, the rules against "touting", if strictly interpreted, would prohibit vir-
tually all the proactive work routinely undertaken by clinics.
36. 1 am advised that, in what may be taken as a symbolic expression of this attitude on
the part of the Law Society, a complaint of unauthorized practice brought against a
community legal worker in Toronto in the late 1970's has never been finally dis-
posed of, and officially still stands adjourned sine die.
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correcting the dependency-fostering effects of the traditional lawyering and
social service models, including the role of community legal workers and the
systemic approach to analyzing problems, are all important, but the bottom
line factor in ensuring the continuing ability of clinics to develop these
non-traditional methods is the presence of strong community-based Boards.
To the extent that these Boards truly reflect community involvement in and
support of the clinics, they represent a political power base that can counteract
the pressures emanating from government, the traditional bar, and organized
clinic adversaries.
There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between clinic activism on behalf
of client groups and the development of representative and committed
Boards. A clinic that sees organizing and outreach as integral to its work will
find that among the client groups with whom it works there will be many
people who will take an active interest in supporting the clinic and having
input into its policies and practices; thus such a clinic is more likely to
develop a strong, representative and committed Board. Such a Board is, in
turn, more likely to see the maintenance of that broad range of clinic activities
as important to its constituency and to be prepared to guard its independence
from the funders in order to protect those activities. Conversely, if a clinic
staff has a more traditional view of the provision of legal aid services that
does not include a commitment to social change, the work it engages in is
less likely to result in the recruitment of a strong Board, since its contact with
clients will tend to be limited to discrete encounters coterminous with the
formal or informal disposition of the individual clients' particular problems.
Board development and the building of a strong clinic movement should be
seen as being among the most crucial community development projects that
clinics can, and must, engage in. The strengthening of community control is
important not just for its effect on the "outputs" of the system, but also for
its intrinsic value as an experience in the building of democratic and par-
ticipatory structures designed to facilitate peoples' own articulation of their
needs and goals and the collective action necessary for their advancement.
This last observation illustrates something I alluded to in the early part of this
paper: the mutuality of means and ends. The picture which emerges from
looking at the situation of the clinic movement is one in which the substantive
social goals-more democracy and equality; less hierarchy and enforced
dependency-are reflected in the methods, organizational structures and
interpersonal relations which are used in working toward those goals. In this
way, the vehicles of social reform attain more than an instrumental sig-
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nificance in relation to the ultimate ends. They can be experiments in, and
living examples of, different and better ways of doing things. They have an
intrinsic value which does not depend on the ultimate success of preformu-
lated long-term goals. It is only through partially and tentatively actualizing,
in the here and now, aspects of the social ideal, that the conceptual and
practical divide between realism and utopian inspiration can be mediated and
the sense of futility which that divide engenders, avoided. The mechanisms
of power can never completely foreclose the possibility of such actualization.
The paralysing dilemma posed by the reform/revolution dichotomy of tradi-
tional left social theory is thus dissolved by the refusal to suppose a radical
disjunction between a movement's (or an individual's) ultimate goals and the
local and immediate struggles in which it is engaged. And in the case of
community legal clinics, the strategic benefits to the movement of taking
seriously the development of strong and committed grassroots accountability
suggests that the fusion of ends and means also coincides with the strengthen-
ing and consolidation of local and incremental social justice struggles into
secure bases for further and wider progress. The admonition of the Attorney-
General of Ontario, that "[lI]egal clinics are not open-ended institutions for
social reform",37 just "ain't necessarily so". 38
37. Interview with Ian Scott, supra, note 29,4.
38. George Gershwin and DuBose Heyward, "It Ain't Necessarily So", from the musical
Porgy and Bess.
